

Democracy: an Incomplete Invention. Reflections on Giovanni Sartori's what is Democracy?

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Abstract

Democracy has undergone several conceptual reductions as a result of liberal theories, for they have disdained any other form of popular expression and have risen as the only and irreplaceable market model: an individual enterprise and negative freedom, as an essential aspect of a political organization. Thus, society is strictly based on individualities whose virtue is the individual, with self-management capacity that must be preserved by the State, in a liberal perspective the State is a rational creation of humanity, not superior or an executioner. Geovanny Sartori makes an example of such reduction of the potential political organization, under the idea that the exclusive and exclusionary political value is part of the liberal model; not even in ancient Greece, nor in current times with those that propose a different concept of living in society, is it possible to have democracy without the prevalence of individual interests. However, politics, even with a theoretical basis, is a practical and factual activity, in the liberal model, throughout history, there is a denial of their own statement: human dignity from an individual.

Keywords: Democracy, individual, market, model, dignity, freedom.

1. Introduction

The situation with democracy—intentional italics—is not a simple matter that is solved through an election process or that is limited to the decision of the greater number of voters (that is, as Borges puts it an abuse of statistics).

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If the nature of the matter were only numbers, if the only value came from the will of the majority, humanity would not have experienced the tragedies that have been lived in order to solidify it. If democracy is expressed through two simple as well as suspicious procedures, such as voting and counting, action the way it is for societies, it would make no sense to think, write, fight and die for something so trivial. In its nature there is the will to subject to a form of government, believed to be the best, and which justifies its collective acceptance.

From ancient times until today, the question about the State has been there, the reason for obedience, the usefulness of following norms, the most adequate norms, and it has been a reason to wonder that is still around. In order to make references to some theories, in Plato's Republic (trad. 1998), the community is born from a mutual cooperation.

(...) "well then- I said-, the State is born when each one of us is not self-sufficient, and needs many things. Or do you think that there is a different origin to the foundation of the State?..." In such case, when a person associates with others because they have specific need, and then with another because of a different need, and with other and other, and there is a need for many things, they come together in one specific place where people can associate and help each other. Should we not name such common place as State?(Plato, 1998: pp- 121-122).

For Bonadino (2000) the republic can be conceived only as sovereignty, with a specific focus: "Republic is a strict government made up of several families, and the common element is that of sovereignty" (p. 9). Sovereignty pursues happiness in contemplation.

"If the true happiness of a republic and that of an individual are one and the same, if the general well-being of the republic and that of the individual lays in the intellectual and contemplative virtue, regarding more advanced spirits, it is necessary, likewise, to acknowledge the existence of a superior being when the purpose to exercise contemplation of natural human and divine things, while praising the grand prince of nature. If we recognize that the main purpose of the individual's happy life lies in it then we also establish that it becomes the purpose and happiness of a republic" (Bodino, 2000, p. 12).

Thomas Hobbes (1983), in the XVII chapter of the Leviathan, takes the creation of the State as a demonstration of the *recta ratio*, since man continues to be a being moved by passion and in consequence, a wolf as his likeness; it requires that the superior power gathers under its power the dispersed will of its subjects (p.103). John Locke determines the importance of subjection, a legal power that will guarantee natural rights, especially those to life and estate.

Hegel considers the State as an expression of the absolute spirit and Marx sees it a symbol of classes, that which in specific historic circumstances is imposed, not as a well-intended purpose of association, but as a result of the struggle of classes that would define the paradoxical disappearance of the political community.

Theories that range from the structure of an absolute State- monarchic, totalitarian, theocratic- to those who despise any form of authority that weights the will of individuals. Creations that seek to demonstrate the uselessness of the State, or those that achieve, or at least seem to think they have determined their essential role in social development.

Contractarians, metaphysical or materialist theories try to explain a phenomenon which continues to spill ink and blood. This paper focuses precisely in this aspect, specifically on Giovanni Sartori's polemic book: what is democracy? Polemic regarding the liberal dogmatism that seems to flaunt, which is why, any other form of political power is an institutional fallacy. The fall of communism seemed to prove, not only that Sartori was correct, but also that all of those who received the theoretical confirmation that liberal democracy is the only sensible, rational, humane and in consequence free, of the political being. The extermination of totalitarianism in Eastern Europe, a historical symbol of the denial of freedom, would lead without any doubt—and it is here that the dogma lies—to the definite fulfillment of the bourgeoisie ideal: materializing individual rights over the cumbersome machinery of the State. That, at least, is the principle.

The 90's would be the lab that tried to bring perfection to the democratic experiment by thoroughly living the neoliberal gospel, made with the prescribed ingredients and with the consent of Washington D.C., a salutary potion, with some violent reactions to the organisms, but with effective results. The facts do not deny the faith, at least in statistics that are done by those who apply the prescriptions.

The neoliberal *novus ordo* will be but of the People, as always the shelter of the sacred freedom, like in the crusades, to defend that which is worth dying over.

However, it seems that history did not end with the dictum of Fukuyama (1992)- the end of the history-, it goes on and the wheels keep turning, and in these movements there are opportunities to reconsider the criteria, to delay conclusions, to experiment new recipes, to not give way because of the effects of a beverage not agreeable to any type of nature, to cry out for help right until the last minute; a cry that could very well be that of a mermaid of new era.

I. Approaching the concepts of democracy

The definitions usually have a certain level of imprecision, especially in the quicksand of the human sciences. The consensus in this field is not always convenient, that is why it is sometimes better to speak of a notion. Regarding democracy it is a paradigmatic terrain because it has been the object of countless studies, with conclusions, though important not less ambiguous. The Greek, under the leadership of Aristotle, had a thorough theoretical corpus for that historical moment, which is still a scenario of dispute. The *Nichomachean Ethics* when discussing the diverse political regimes establishes the framework of types of governments and their specific deviations, and regarding democracy says that:

Timocracy opens the way to democracy, but they both have their limits; actually, timocracy can be a government for the masses, and all those that own real state are equal. Democracy is the lesser evil of the deviations because it deviates but a little from the concept of the republic. (Aristotle, trad. In 1988, p. 341).

And in *Politics* establishes: "instead of saying that democracy exists when the free exercise sovereignty and calls it oligarchy when it is exercised by the rich (...) There is democracy when the free and poor, being majority, exercise the sovereignty of power" (Aristotle, trans. In 1988, p. 225). In current terms, there is no democracy in our times. If the condition *sine qua non* which is that the poor govern, the panorama is quite desolate in the world.

Notice that there is distance from what the Greek until now and this form of government, regarding the XXI century, contrary to what Sartori had warned of, it is a matter of years, not content. The electoral processes are worked out through the will of the masses, they are the ones that decide and regardless of their fragile (not academic, mere intuition) conception of what just, correct or of the most effective is, determine who governs. Sartori abominates the so called democracy of ancient times, since it left no field of action for the individual liberty. The public absorbed the life of the people of that time, any liberal would consider this a tragedy of the tyranny:

The meaning of denying that the freedom of ancient times was actually freedom is now clear. If by freedom we are to understand the individual state of independence and security, It was not (...) the formula "all polis" promotes or can promote a democracy with a high communitarian fusion. The formula "all within the State" that would later be "all for the State" is instead that of a totalitarian State. Under the Greek concept we would be perfectly be considered slaves. (Sartori, 1994, p. 145)

In these historical gaps of approximation to the concept of democracy the Middle Ages have little to bring forward, we only have to say that it was a period of darkness, with some flashes of intellectual rebellion in several fields. However, on the State, and specifically on the Republic, it was Machiavelli, famous for his work *The Prince*, but hardly known for his book "Discourses to the first republic of Tito Livio". In the *Prince* he offers the necessary recommendation to reach power and to be able to maintain it, desacralizing the State; by taking away from it the entire moral Christian concept and by creating the *virtú* as the capacity the ruler has to show the difficulties in the exercise or to dominate the State. However, in the *Discourses* there is a genuine supporter of the republic with a democratic component. He praises the Romans for preserving the republic through a skillful combination of aristocracy, monarchy and democracy, and at the same time rescuing it from tyranny by creating institutions that held popular clamor. The Republic, defined itself as belonging to all, covers the collective needs, not those of individuals: this aspect would become inalienable in future projects. Machiavelli's *Discourses* is often overlooked, but it is not less transcendental in the history of modern political thinking (Machiavelli, 1980, p. 32).

The end of the Middle Ages brought the light of reason, along the contractarians: Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, Montesquieu, Sieyes, among others. Hobbes begins the philosophical politics with *De Cive*, a book that next to this magna work the *Leviathan* would be considered of a lesser standard, but that would become the fundamental essence in the modern thinking. Even though Hobbes is considered a supporter of absolutism, it is undeniable that his contractarian basis planted the seed for the future democratic model. In the second chapter of *De Cive* he establishes the characteristics for the contracts which are derived from the natural law as a dictum of reason.

The first natural law is the search for peace and it is achieved through a pact that men agree on. It is a mutual transference of their rights in order to reach a sublime goal: peace as a presupposition of life. In the seventh chapter, there is a dissertation on the three forms of governments that the State can have: democracy, aristocracy and monarchy. Regarding democracy, he defines it as an elected assembly. If he is not a supporter of democracy, for he deems it fragile because many criteria at the moment of making decisions creates schisms that break unions and weaken the State, he does acknowledge it as an option for individuals to conform the State. The English philosopher does not believe in the effectiveness of mixed forms as Machiavelli did, on the contrary he recommends one of the previously mentioned three, as being the most effective, that is monarchy.

John Locke defines the lines of the liberal state in two treatises on civil government. He does not agree with Hobbes regarding the fact that the natural state is a war scenario and therefore, under the urgent need to overcome it before the chaos that reigns due to the absence of a superior power that can guarantee the natural rights, the State becomes a necessity.

Contrary to any expression of absolutism, there is a general claim for the freedom in all different ways, aside from the divine rights. There is the foundation of freedom over human reason, it guides their acts and that is why Man by creating the state does not renounce their natural rights, the State guarantees freedom, it is not its torturer, therefore it requires a legitimate government only possible under the free will of humanity. In chapter X the second essay on civil government affirms that when majority decides on their destiny, by making and executing laws, we are before a democracy. It is necessary to remember that Locke divides the legislative and executive power, as long as it strives to preserve the nature of the associates: right to life, to real state and freedom, among others. People are, in consequence, the basis of all determination.

In this little book (only in size) Locke tells Chevallier (1985) "I had established the definite way, the basis of liberal democracy, the individualist essence, whose great card was made through the declaration of rights and natural rights, unalienable and imprescriptibly... in the insurrected American colonies, and after in the revolutionary France" (p. 100) A democracy is not possible without the respect of freedom and real state in which decisions are made as a group, especially in the executive power, orienting its actions through the law the legislative branch makes, not their personal will: "wherever law ends, tyranny begins" (Locke, p. 192).

De l'esprit des lois was the most ambitious compendium that has been done until now by the different political regimes. Montesquieu creates a portentous compendium on the theory of the state and on the comparative law. He adds another branch to Locke's public branches of power the legislative and executive- the judicial. In the book XI (*Des lois qui forment la liberté politique, dans son rapport avec la constitution*), Montesquieu (1983), widely exposes the idea of freedom. The starting point is in the working use of the term freedom, given the number of definitions, therefore, the meaning is sealed like: its meaning like this: "La liberté est le droit de faire tout ce que les lois permettent" (p 292). And the construction that really establishes the true spirit of freedom is the English one. The law is the technical configuration of the aspirations of man and freedom for the thinkers, rationalists, was no more than their natural condition. A mandate of the State, if in fact represents the aspirations of its people, it must have the privilege way of protecting this value. Freedom is only possible in a moderate government; the author assimilates it to the republic, because:

“La démocratie et l’aristocratie en sont point des états libre par leur nature. La liberté politique ne se trouve que dans les gouvernements modérés” (Montesquieu, 1983, p. 293). However, freedom and equality go hand in hand, and then to frugality. In the book V, Montesquieu discerns on laws and the relationship they have with the type of government it has. On legislation in a democracy, he upholds the need to accomplish equality; frugality is necessary, which is proscribing the excesses of the effect of what there is for all:

El ne suffit pas, dans une bonne démocratie, que les portions de terres soient égales; il faut qu’elles soient petites, comme chez les Romains. “A dieu en plaise, disait Curius á ses soldats, qu’un citoyen estime peu de terre, ce qui est suffisant pour nourrir un homme” Comme l’égalité des fortunes entretient la frugalité, la frugalité maintient l’égalité des fortunes. (Montesquieu, 1983, p. 173).

Freedom and liberty based on the law, that is, on the state, and in this case a republic moderates the ambition in the limits established in the norm. In 1762, J.J. Rousseau published his social contract, key to the historic development of liberal democracy, even though, Isaiah Berlin (2003) thought him a traitor of freedom (2003); the Genevan longs the absence of holding to natural life, because man, according to his criteria, is born free. The contract, even if necessary is not less hurtful for man; however, life in society demands it.

La volonté générale is not a simple sum of individual criteria; these are selfish, they look to their own benefit, since that is the pure expression of man in society: Finding a form of association that defends and protects with common force the person and the wealth of each one, and therefore, joining all does not follow but oneself and remain as free as before (Rousseau, year, p. 86).

Such is the fundamental problem that the social contract (free translation) provides a solution. The general will is a means as well as an end. As a means it pretends to establish forms of governments that guarantee the natural rights; as an end it becomes the selection that is best for man, which is not anything that falls far from reason. Independently of the form of government, the State should provide prosperity and the conservation of its members (Rousseau, year, p, 86). That State in which citizens are multiplied is the best one. There is also the idea that Rousseau does not believe in democracy due to its impossibility, since it “goes against natural order that the major numbers govern and the less are governed” (Rousseau, year, p.68). Regardless of the lack of definition of the author of the contract, regarding naming the most recommendable, the elements of liberal beliefs are present in his work: pact, election, voting, natural rights, division of powers, force of the law, no abuse of power, even for the majority.

All sorts of theories seem to have derived from Rousseau's work, maybe due to their internal contradictions, but there are elements that do not allow a greater polemic regarding their adscription to the liberating thinking (beyond liberal): equality and freedom. These dimensions are inseparable in any democratic theory.

Emmanuel Sieyès gave birth to a great legacy which was enough to set the prairies on fire: *¿qu'est-ce que le Tiers état?* (What is the third State?). He begins with three questions that still break the dreams of those that reflect on the political phenomenon 1. *¿qu'est-ce que le Tiers état? tout.*

2. *Qu'a-t-il été jusqu'à présent dans l'ordre politique? Rien.* 3. *Que demande-t-il? – Aître quelque chose- what is the third state, everything.* What has it been until now? Nothing. What does it demand? To be something. And it is a trilogy of questions that the author resolves by assigning the power of decision to the people as a majority. The privileges continue to be anchored to institutions that not only ignore the needs of the plain state, but that constitute an infinitesimal quantity in the general states. In simple terms: they usurp power, for they are less; here the issue of majority has a greater weight. And besides they do not represent the others, the third state, which is a whole nation. Regarding nobility and clergy or even the triple aristocracy according to Sieyès, *L'Église, la Robe et l'Épée* (Church, army and clergy) oversee their interest and do not reflect the general feelings that are awkward and even on opposite sides of the third state and meant absolutely nothing. It is a double negation: in the quantitative perspective because it denies the rights of the majority, in qualitative terms because it is the majority that produce wealth.

Sieyès determined in the nation a new figure that represented the third state, all in power of action, trying to eradicate the privilege. If he accepted, different to Rousseau, the representation, maintained the criteria of the sovereignty as a prerogative of the plain state. The nation is all and, therefore, it is superior. It is the owner of the destiny, which is not other than power. It is even placed above the constitution. The majority, fundamentals democracy, for Sieyès it is the called one to produce the radical change that is needed. The debacle of the ancient regime was under way, the revolution came up as an immense wave that would cover all of Europe and the book of Sieyès, published in 1789 was like music to the environment.

The XIX century, brought important characters to the political environment, many contrary to their contractarian predecessors, even the most notable, for being its heir was Marx. Philosopher from the academy, and empirical economist, his genius gave way to the rupture in the conception of the economy and the social relations, which are still considered valid in the world.

The Bourgeois democracy, based on their economy, the capitalism, is not a true democracy but a configuration of interest in class, a minority nonetheless, against what is named as the proletariat, which in reality provides wealth. The State is democratic, not aristocratic, nor monarchic per se, but for a class that holds power, which in any case is not in the hands of the people. Regarding this issue, Engels (1976) says:

The state was born out of the need to stop the antagonisms of the classes and at the same time, it was born in the middle of the conflicts of these classes, which as a general rule that the state belong to the most dominating class, the economically dominant class, that with these resources also becomes politically dominant class acquiring new means of repression and exploitation of the oppressed class. ...thus, the old State was, above all, the States for slavers to subjugate the slaves, the feudal State was the organ in which the nobility relied to subjugate the peasants and in the modern state the tool that serves capital in order to exploit the hired hand. (p. 346)

The antagonism can be resolved in Hegelian dialectic as a thesis that will be the new class in power, the proletariat. In this group reside the genuine nature of the liberation and the real democracy of the people, well beyond the pure form of the bourgeois law:

As it is logic, we shall not take upon the work of illustration our illustrious philosophers regarding the "liberation" of "man" that has not taken a step forward, not even if they have dissolved the philosophy, the theology, the substance and all other junk in "self-consciousness", if man has been freed from the domination of these sentences, to which man has never been submitted, about the real liberation it is only possible in the real world and with real means, that cannot abolish slavery without the vapor machine and mule jenny, that cannot the regime of serfdom without an improved agriculture and in general it cannot free man while the conditions of food, drink, life and clothing cannot be fully assured in enough quantity and quality. The liberation is a historical act, not a mental one and it will conduct historical relations to it, the state, the industry, the commerce and the agriculture. (Marx & Engels, 1976, p. 22-23).

Under this criteria of true democracy based on a concrete problem solution by taking power, it will have a factual expression of the revolutions of the XX century and create a schism of the political thinking that still upholds. John Stuart Mill a liberal of utilitarian tendency (a disciple of Bentham) comes up in the scenery of the political movements with a theory that reduces power of the majority in democracy and increases the power of a certain aristocracy.

That is how his book on representative government points out two dangers that threaten the representative government: the low level of intelligence of their representatives that control the popular opinion and the type of legislation that comes from this context.

He establishes that democracy has two incorrect ideas: on the one side there is something like pure democracy, the government of the people and for the people, with equal representation and from such conception comes the belief that the government of the people with an exclusive representation. The first one is a synonym of citizen equality and the second one is the privileged government of the majority, the one that holds the power of the State due to their numbers even to incur in arbitrariness resulting according to Mill in contempt for the minorities.

According to Mill, democracy ends up becoming a government of the masses with prerogatives, in detriment of the minorities. In simple terms, what determines its nature which is the representation of the different ways of conceiving power and society, which transforms into a dictatorship of the masses. There is no less injustice because minorities suffer it. For Mill the concept of the majority is a *mentis* that does not necessarily express the feelings and purposes of the electors. The minorities ought to be properly represented; on the contrary it is no more than a false democracy. Stuart Mill (1862) assumes the electoral reform proposal presented by Mr. Hare in a text titled "Treatise on the Election of representatives", whose thesis is that of establishing a national representation and not a local one: "the votes would, as a present, be given locally; but any elector would be at liberty to vote for any candidate in whatever part of the country he might offer himself" (p. 140).

It is not the purpose of this quote to detail the proposal that was quite a novelty for its time, but to understand in general terms the dissatisfaction that the liberal system of representation in England created in intellectuals such as Mill. He did not agree with posing beneficial to the masses *per se*, and even referred to it along the cited text in the "dictatorship of the majority", that is, that the sum of the many does not necessarily lead because of the circumstances to a better government.

The XX century was lavishing in ideas on democracy but on two different sides: the liberal and the socialist. The latter with factual verifications such as the Russian and Chinese Revolutions, the anti-colonialism movements backed by leftist governments, a conflict that went through the last century and it is more vital now than ever. Actually, after the instauration of the Bolshevik Regime (1917) and the German revolution inspired by Rosa Luxemburg that came close to winning, along the post war capitalist system crisis, the model of that state with a base of Keynesian guidelines was put in place, the private initiative to boost the economy and provide welfare for the population.

A social action was required, that is, the State ought to provide employment, develop infrastructure, and provide loans and unemployment benefits, an effect of moderating with the cyclic recessions of the market.

The United States, under Franklin Delano Roosevelt overcame the 1929 economical crisis with a set of official measures in the framework of the welfare state; a set of policies that came halfway between state and private sector. In Europe, the same thing was done and was accomplished by reducing the revolutionary rush stimulated by the Soviet example.

After the Second World War, the world was split with the rising of two super powers like symbols of opposite ideas. On the one side there was the defense of the liberal market with the determination of the State to correct the faults in it, but always within a liberal individual schemata, and on the other side, the communist system with powerful values such as the Soviet union and the Republic of China, who decided to take up the fight, which was at the very beginning, leaning in favor of the market and therefore of the liberal democracy. Such is the appreciation of Fukuyama and Sartori; which sentenced the end of history, not in terms of the spirit absolutism of the Hegelian State, but set to defeat totalitarianism and the definite triumph of capitalism, in a not very different way, by stating that the liberal is the only democracy there is.

Before them, organic intellectuals such as Friederich Hayek, von Mises, and Milton Friedman among others had already created the theory of the minimum State, of the exclusively individual initiative and the correlative privatization of State infrastructure. Less state and more democracy, seems to be motto of this sector of liberal thinking. Friedman in his works *Free to Choose* and *Capitalism and Freedom*, established the guidelines for neoliberalism which was executed in Chile in the 70's after the coup d'État, under the wise advisory of the Chicago Boys, technocrats trained in the University of Chicago by Milton Friedman, and later sealed in the consensus in Washington, some years later, amid the joy of the capitalist triumph.

Under this theory, the State ought to be a minimal part of the social specter, anything that interferes in the private initiative is coersion, and tyrannies are usually born in the public sphere. The market works as a dynamo of the economical development and the prosperity of humankind as well. The State is an obstacle, which must be removed.

Two conservative leaders of the 80's would transform the dream of neoliberals and make it become a reality: Margaret Thatcher in Great Britain and Ronald Reagan in the United States. In the following decade, the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the previous fall of the Berlin Wall (some years prior) and the revolutions in the iron curtain, showed that there was no enemy left to vanquish.

Democracy, that which according to Sartori (1994) is expressed in “a free society, not oppressed by a discretionary or uncontrollable political power, nor dominated by a closed oligarchy or restricted in which the government “responds” to the governed” (p. 23-24), would triumph.

Nevertheless, and under the social facts, something did not work out well in the market model. It seems that the flaws of liberal democracy are not very far from what others pointed out as socialist ironies: exclusion in decisions, a minority-number of market- with the power of decisions, transformed monopolies with relative speed into the oligopolies, absence of reports of unused fortunes under the conquered freedom, high poverty levels became the new evils of democracy.

III. Democracy model or models

Alexis de Tocqueville declared his perplexity before the show of the American democracy (United States), and showed it as an example in the western hemisphere. In 1835 he published *de la démocratie en Amérique*, a description –and a panegyric– of the democratic system in that country. In the introduction he expresses that “*parmi les objets nouveaux qui, pendant mon séjour aux États-Unis, ont attiré mon attention, aucun n’a plus vivement frappé mes regards que l’égalité des conditions.*” (p. 4). Such statement could be quite valid in the XIX century; the author did not see all or according to Howard Zinn, made a mistake. If there is a statistical analysis for the time, the data that Tocqueville used to affirm the amazement of the singular equality that governed in the United States turned out to be a mistake.

Howard Zinn (1988), in “*A People history of the United States*” offers this report on the conditions of the population during the third decade of the XIX century: In Philadelphia, 55% of the working class usually lived in a rented a room per family, without healthy conditions, no toilets, no air nor water. The clean water from the Schuylkill River was pumped only to the rich class (...) In new York, you could see the poor thrown on the streets and whose only company was the trash. There was no sewage system in the ghettos and black waters would leak to the backyards and alleys and even the basements of houses of the poor classes, which resulted in typhoid and typhus in 1842. During the cholera outbreak in 1932, the rich ran away from the city while the poor stayed and died. (p. 218)

And all this without referring to the infamous conditions of the legal slavery that were in place in the paradise of freedom. John Little, a slave of the time (XIX century), cited by Zinn (1988), stated that: They say that slaves are happy, because they laugh and are happy. And other three or four have received 200 lashings a day while chained: even at night we sing and dance and laugh to sound of our own chains. We could have been happy.

We did every possible thing to ignore our condition and not break our hearts; it is not as true as with the gospel we need only look, Should we not have been happy? Today I still do it-dance in my chains (p. 172).

Tocqueville's positive awe was in many aspects justified, the narration makes his work believable, but the silence before certain horrors brings us to consider the American democracy and incomplete system. Equality and freedom, both faces of the same coin for the French author, were not present, at least for a wide portion of the people, white and black, all living under a common factor: poverty, which is closely related to exclusion.

If political thinking hides the part of reality like in the case of Democracy in America, the literature takes over this task, by displaying a fiction of a world that claims justice. Steinbeck (1996) in *The Grapes of Wrath* tells about poverty of the 30's in Oklahoma, after the depression of 1929. A truck transports Tom Joad and his family, all farmers to California, with only the broken down vehicle and the raggedy clothing of the owners. There was no way to survive in their land, and the bank had already executed the mortgage, that is why they went away, with the hope of finding a place in their own county, in which they would not be condemned to eviction.

It is not rhetoric poetry, but the portrait of a society that lived in the nightmare side of the glorified American democracy. Without equality there is no freedom, and therefore, there is no justice, a human aspiration without any political ticket.

The democratic model has versions and they do not always coincide and they can even be on opposite sides. One of them is the liberal democracy, which shows two faces: social democracy and neoliberalism. They share the division of powers, free elections, individual initiatives, free market. However, they are far from the role of the State. The social democracy tried out the Welfare State following the 1929 market crash. In other words, the individual gave way to the State with the purpose of moderating the excesses of the market, which is Capitalism. The poverty Steinbeck described was not the result of bad cropping by Tom Joad, but the consequence of an economic system that above all is political and that coincides with the freedom as a maximum skill in the art of surviving and conquering, without commiseration.

In the years following the Keynesian trial in the United States, part of Europe started to use the social democratic model and it worked, not only in the sense of providing quality of life and development for the people; but, in eliminating any socialist revolutionary ambition. The other version of democracy is socialism, which for a historic moment of the XX century took over a considerable part of the planet.

The socialist claim the true democracy in their thinking schemata, as they try to show that without the working class in power, the government cannot be considered of the masses and that in the bourgeois model there is a dominion of minority interests marked by the market flow. General interest is not the main focus in the demo-liberal system, it is the power of money; or in more specific terms, liberalism is not democratic, as long as there is a total dependence on the flow of merchandise, and man is part of it. According to Antonio Garcia (1971) capitalism:

Humanity is not part of the economic formulas as a person of needs but as how much his or her acquisition power is. The salesperson only cares for the client with a hundred pairs of idle shoes, not for the thousands or millions of children without any acquisition power or for those with physical needs that turn into a theoretical value. This is how the person disappears behind objects: by growing smaller behind mountains of things.

The conceptual conflict is quite long and with heavy argumentative artillery. Giovanni Sartori develops a strong defense of the liberal democracy, based on the accomplishments and the correlative failure of other models; such failure that comes from the nature of the models, which are utopist and hope to become a reality. In the IV chapter of his work, *What is Democracy?* Sartori (1994) writes: "the concept of self-government is easy to define in abstract planes: it is to govern oneself. But the concepts applied to the real world must be well thought out" (p.46). Self government is not possible under the concept the author takes as direct democracy, because of time and extension.

In essence the rule establishes that the intensity of self-government is at maximum level when the extension is at its minimum and diminishes when the extension increases (...) first case: interior self-government (in interiore hominis) or also known as the despot's self-government. Actually, the intensity is at its maximum level because the extension is zero (...) in the polis self-government was possible, as pointed out by Aristotle, due to the rapid rotation in government positions, since there was the chance to govern and be governed at the same time. (...) third case: the extension of a big city or also, there is not much difference-of a region. Here the intensity of self-government is lowest (Sartori, 1994, p. 146).

The perfectionist believes that it is a model that can be practiced in which the people guide themselves and make their own decisions without any intermediaries. However, perfectionism is the wrong way to understand the ideals, according to Sartori (1994). This takes place in time: Based on the experience of the community of Paris in 1871, Marx proposed a model that he admired for a "government by the people and for the people".

In this regard, Marx "made the moment eternal" (the Paris Community lasted exactly two months and ten days) and it totally ignored the problem of length. In Marx the light of a thunder became eternity-at the end of the Hegelian history-as if it were continuous and constantly reproducible. (p. 47).

In conclusion, the model comes up as a necessary concretion of freedom and equality, according to Sartori, it would not turn out to be a reality because of time and space to do so, and that is why history is sought. Believing that democracy can be direct and permanent is a total utopia dressed up as perfectionism.

On the whole Greek experience regarding democracy, he establishes that it was given because of the lack of privacy of the individuals of the time. It is not an issue of time, but of State interference in the intimate sphere of their associates: The formula "all in the polis" promotes or can promote a democracy with a high level of communitarian fusion. The formula "all within the State" that is later explained as "all for the state" is on the other hand the formula for the totalitarian States. In the Greek fashion, we would perfectly be slaves. (Sartori, 1994, p. 146).

Thus, Which model according to Sartori, the one that expresses the genuine virtues of democracy? Can it be liberal democracy, but what type of liberalism? Because in the previous chapter there was a recompilation of the theories on democracy, and important theorists were called upon, and form popular participation in state affairs was the warrantee of equality. Sartori does not agree. Nor does he subscribe the socialist democracy which he considers totalitarianism. It is then, the market democracy, which from Hayeck and Friedman abhors any kind of state interference in private affairs, especially in business management. If the private sector undergoes public control, it is forsaking the most primal and untransferable value of liberal democracy: freedom. Sartori says (1994):

After more than half a century of lacerations, we have once again understood that liberal democracy-the real name of the real thing- it is not only necessary for democrat that wants welfare, equality and social cohesion; but whoalso needs freedom focused on the problems of political serfdom, of State infrastructure and of individual initiative. Democracy without freedom is dead. It is important to say that along with liberal democracy, democracy also dies, whatever one wants to understand and even though we understand (sic) to the point and the way the ancient world did (p.210).

Liberal democracy is redundant, because it is another way to see the phenomenon, it is as naive as is incorrect. Following this way of thinking a simple conclusion can be reached: democracy, more than liberal, given its divergences, is a democracy of markets.

If the individual initiative is sacrificed at the altar of the State, with equalitarian purposes, then we are before totalitarianism because the market will never be totalitarian, it is pure and aseptic.

However, if the State, according to Sartori (and the neoliberals), is some sort of toxic for freedom, the market is able to self-regulate because its flaws are strictly the business of the agents that are part of its development. The natural mismatches of the private traffic, its relations cannot be object of State intervention, because that is part of the tyranny of the State. Thus, does the market self-regulate? To be exact, is the market a state within a state? Or in which events would public interference be allowed? Never? Sometimes? And if it is so, who decides? Does the market itself decide?

The book "The silent takeover", Noreena Hertz (2001) describes the following panorama: the lack of corporation self-government (corporations or multinational corporations) but its government, to use a better word the power that they exercise over the States: "politician's solutions to the collective needs are based on the market. They allow consumerism, the infallible power of the liberal market and the financial monopolies to determine the public agenda" (p. 5) The author asks What is the value of representation, if I will demonstrate our politicians pay more attention to the corporate world than their electors? (Hertz, 2001, p. 5). In other words, Is Sartori correct when he whips the public and elevates the private initiative to a level of holiness, as if it were neutral in the mercantile manifestation? Are we not before the contrary phenomenon of power inversion? Is it not that the State is giving way to the private sector and the democratic representation the most sacred value of the liberal thinking sector is turned into merchandise? Are we not witnessing the death of what has classically held the State power, even if at a minimum level, and in a correlative fashion to the rising of a dictatorship that cannot be grasped, that is indeterminable and therefore hard to oppose because it is spread within the businesses that are establishing democracies throughout the world? Are we not in a phase of survival, as in a natural state, which was overcome in liberal key ideas by embracing the contract?

Professor Francisco Cortés (2007), focusing on exclusion, affirms that:

In the modern political way of thinking, the question of the creation of the State was established in terms of the barbaric or civilized dualism, natural or civil state, war involving all against all or social peace, anarchy or order. The problem with the creation of a political order consisted in how to overcome anarchy, chaos, mess, insecurity, and war into how to subject violence, brutality and barbaric in human relationships to a civilized limit, that is, a limit that allows the free, rational and autonomous development of the human life. (p. 33). For Cortés, the State (2007), is worth as long as it is able to overcome the barbaric in the war that is product of exclusion:

We are referring to racial exclusion which is the result of not acknowledging the racial and cultural differences (...) we are referring to an economical exclusion that results in great material inequalities (...) we are finally referring to the political exclusion, as a consequence of economic exclusion: the deficiencies in nourishment, the lack of health, the lack of education, employment and social protection have hindered and hinder the members of the society to be the normal participants of civil and political life. (pp. 34-35). As history has shown us, the market is not inclusive, since it is not representative; it holds no obligations to justice.

Along with market expansion, as a regulator of public policies, gives way to the rise of a more definite power each time, what Jairo Estrada Álvarez (2006) denominates "the triad of design and the implementation of a neoliberal order" (p. 444). Three institutions, the International Chamber of Commerce, International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are responsible for giving instructions regarding the duties of the different governments that are part of this sphere of power, private institutions that do not represent the general interest of the population, but of those who have the passion and the possibility of business. These are not political bodies in the strict sense of the Word, but they decide over the public sector; since they do not have a position of democratic representation, they are beyond a revocation at the polls; that is, they are over and outside of democracy, but they determine its destiny. In this sense, Guillermo O'Donnell's (1995) indication on the materialization of the citizens through participation as an "exercise of political rights that connotes the running of democracy as well as the efficiency of personal warrantees consecrated in liberal tradition" is relevant. (p. 125).

As it is, the discourse of democracy is so wide, complex and controversial that any exclusive and excluding typology goes against the facts. From the Greek demos, to the State acknowledged and guaranteed individual freedoms, designed by the illustrated liberal and the social democracy with State presence to the privatizing neoliberalism there are deep musings. In the specific case of Latin America, the theoretical stances on democracy go on opposite sides. From those who believe with blind faith that overcoming the dictatorships entails a crystallization of the model, or those who assume that this step is an initial transit towards a real rising of the People to power, to those who regard the electoral process as a phenomenon that represents the elite classes. These are roster and style changes, but they are not substantial. Atilio Borón (1995) writes:

Democracy does not live with the extremes; the excessive poverty and its counterpart the ostentation of the plutocracy are incompatible with their effectiveness. If the poor become homeless and the rich become magnates, democracy, at first stops, then it becomes a farce and finally there is "honesty" between economy and politics through a restoration of the dictatorship. (p. 124).

The relationship between democracy and liberalism defended by Sartori as indissoluble and unique, Boron (2003) describes it as: That is why the synthesis between liberalism and democracy has had as a characteristic the chronic instability: it is a volatile and difficult mixture of antagonist principles of the constitution of political power that is not bound in a unitary and coherent discourse. Such evidence, however, is not enough to dissuade a legion of ideologues that feel empowered to preach the existence of an unbreakable bond between liberalism and democracy. (p. 56). The representation that Sartori points out as an irreplaceable value of the liberal democracy, ends up, due to the circumstance, in a question: who does the market represent? that is, does the State as a product of a free election and aware of the population decide on its behalf? Noreena Hertz (2001) offers an interesting answer:

Quid pro Quo. This level the campaign spending is inherently problematic. The escalating costs of running campaigns and supporting political parties can no longer be met by membership contributions, union funds (where they are given), or personal donations. Even in countries that provide some degree of direct state funding to political parties, the funds provided by the state are nowhere near enough for today's political extravaganzas"... "So who do politicians turn to, to meet the shortfall? As Grandma would say, the private sector, of course"... "Such funding comes from small elite"... "Of course; corporations are not in the business of giving something for nothing. Money buys action and influence". (p. 8).

The dilemma is: a model of democracy, the liberal one with a pigmy state? Or the one that social democracy defends with a regulating public sector that amends the natural defects of the market? Or a democracy with an encompassing State and regulator of the essential services which distributes national wealth and controls with an iron fist the private initiative? Or why not a model of a regulating State, without monopolies, nor oligopolies, with an incentive toward community management, in constant development of a responsible citizenship, in which the social issues are not freed to the good capitalist will or the waves of the stock market?

Iv. Conclusions

1. Thomas Jefferson (1766) one of the forefathers of the American Revolution, author of the Declaration of Independence wrote in 1793 in his Cabinet Opinion: I consider the people who constitute a society or nation as the source of all authority in that nation; as free to transact their common concerns by any agents they think proper; to change these agents individually or the organization of them in form or function whenever they please; that all the acts done by these agents under the authority of the nation are the acts of the nation, are obligatory on them and endure to their use, and can in no wise be annulled or affected by any change in the form of the government, or the persons administering it. (p. 110).

2. The power of the people, in the people and for the people founded the most solid western liberal democracy of the last two centuries, which is what has always been considered, even if the liberty and equality paradigm has been more rhetoric than reality. "The goal of the imperial grand strategy is to prevent any challenge to the power, position and prestige of the United States" (Chomsky, 2003, p. 14), words of the well known liberal Dean Acheson, in 1963, cited by Noam Chomsky in his book *Hegemony or Survival*. In the first years of the present century the United States has renewed its imperial calling, after the September 11th attacks, by privileging its security interests over any other principle, especially those that inspired the Philadelphia Constitution, security over equality and freedom.

Democracy is not a strategy, it is a model of civilized coexistence and it is not private of a specific ideology, but a constant, collective effort, in permanent elaboration, that is incomplete.

Assuming as Sartori does the ownership of the invention of the liberal thinking and excluding any other option based on the historic experience that was seen, it is not only contradictory, but it denies in multiple situations the postulates of the liberal model, evidence of the sectarianism form which certain proclamations are made and some academies and intellectuals based their thoughts and writings.

3. To the excluding voices of the popular and citizen action in which there is a reflective system that turns into real and concrete events, a way of thinking that is the everyday practice of civility in which the human dimension does is not reduced to the value of a miscellaneous merchandise. A political model that is not limited to the scrutiny of the electoral events of counting votes and continuing the ignorance of class power, but to create cultivated spirits that are able to transform a sad and excluding world. According to Amartya Senn (2000):

The relation between individual freedom and social development goes beyond the constitutional connection, no matter how important it is. Which can reach individuals positively depends on the economic opportunities, the political freedoms, the social strengths and the possibilities they bring in terms of health, elementary education and the promotion of initiatives. The institutional mechanisms to profit from these opportunities also depend on the exercise of individual freedoms, through the freedom to participate in social decisions and the elaborations of the public decisions that promote the progress of these opportunities.

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