

Political and Economic Causes of Civil Wars in African Countries Based on Econometric Findings

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Abstract

This paper argues whether civil wars in Africa have economic and political impacts. The approach is based on theory in which rebels will carriage a civil war. Using legit approaches the propositions were tested empirically. In particular, six variables, GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding period, the amount of natural resources, peace period, democracy, social fractionalization, and population size are significant and strong determinants of the duration and the probability of civil wars. The role of policy is the combination of economic diversification, starvation and population deflate, and political reforms so as to avoid emulation situations in African countries.

Keywords: Civil wars, Africa, Economic and Political, Conflict.

Introduction

The end of the Cold War led some to optimistically predict an end to war. Indeed, [1] applied On economic causes of civil war. [2] Further found similar result with what do we know about natural resources and civil war? They found out the relationship between natural resources and civil war. It suggests that collectively they imply four underlying regularities: first, oil increases the likelihood of conflict, particularly separatist conflict; second, 'lootable' commodities like gemstones and drugs do not make conflict more likely to begin, but they tend to lengthen existing conflicts; third, there is no apparent link between legal agricultural commodities and civil war; and finally, the association between primary commodities - a broad category that includes both oil and agricultural goods - and the onset of civil war is not robust.[3] also found the On the incidence of civil war in Africa, they used an econometric model of civil war to the analysis of conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. They show that Africa has had a similar incidence of civil conflict to other developing regions, and, with minor exceptions, its conflicts are consistent with the global pattern of behavior.

However, the structure of risk differs considerably from other regions. Africa's economic characteristics have made it more vulnerable to conflict, but this has been offset by social characteristics that make its societies atypically safe.[4]used case studies to expand economic models of civil war. They designed to refine formal-quantitative models of civil war, expanding them to highlight political processes that lead to civil war. These domestic conflicts pose a significant threat to economic development, especially for these poor African countries. Empirical studied have shown that conflicts can tear down levels of economic development that took decades to achieve. [5] Found Civil war and economic sanctions, they find that the civil war and the economic embargo had a particularly detrimental impact on the nutritional status of rural populations, due to a direct effect of the civil war and to the soaring of food prices during the embargo. In this study, we apply the empirical model approaches of conflicts to investigate the outbreak of civil war in African countries.

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The main interest is to apply the significant impact of political and economic variables on civil war assault in African countries and accordingly propose domestic and international policies to effectively prevent civil wars in African countries. The rest of the study is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the theory of civil war outset and Coastline our hypotheses. Section 3 defines our methodology and data. Section 4 shows our results. Section 5 concludes with some of the policy implications of our analysis.

The Theory of Civil War Outset


[6] They found internal conflict and regional security in Asia and the Pacific. They involved that empirically, the risk of rebellion is strongly linked to three economic conditions: dependence upon primary commodity exports, low average income of the country, and slow growth. They also think that Primary commodity exports are the most loot table of all economic activities. An economy which is dependent upon them thus offers plenty of opportunities for predatory rebellion. One indication that primary commodity exports are highly loot able is that they are also the most heavily taxed activity the same characteristics which make it easy for governments to tax them, make it easy for rebels to loot them. Indeed, rebel predation is just illegal taxation. Conversely, in some countries government has been described as legalized predation in which primary commodities are heavily taxed in order to finance the government elite.[7] found the Empirically assessing the causes of civil war.[8] studied Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war, they find that after controlling for per capita income, more ethnically or religiously diverse countries have been no more likely to experience significant civil violence in this period. The paper argues for understanding civil war in this period in terms of insurgency or rural guerrilla warfare, a particular form of military practice that can be harnessed to diverse political agendas.[9], the authors apply a methodology for organized specification tests to check the robustness of empirical results.

They isolate origins of variation in empirical results by using the same definition of civil war and analyzing the same time period while systematically exploring the sensitivity of eighty-eight variables used to explain civil war in the literature. Several relationships with the onset of civil wars prove robust: large population and low income levels, low rates of economic growth, recent political instability and inconsistent democratic institutions, small military establishments and rough terrain, and war-prone and undemocratic neighbors. Variables representing ethnic difference in the population are robust only in relation to lower level armed conflict. Studies by [10] in Civil war argued that micro-level analysis and case studies are also crucial to decipher war's causes, conduct, and consequences. In their work, they bring a growth theoretic approach to the study of conflict consequences to highlight areas for research, most of all the study of war's impact on institutions.

[11] found Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa, they showed that Armed conflict within nations has had disastrous humanitarian consequences throughout much of the world, they also undertake the first comprehensive examination of the potential impact of global climate change on armed conflict in sub-Saharan Africa.

[12] studied Causes of Civil War in Asia and Sub Saharan Africa, as results, they think that that Both in Asia and in Sub Saharan Africa, civil war is less likely with increased economic development and trade openness, while mixed autocratic-democratic regimes raise the likelihood that states will experience civil war. Although neither ethnic nor religious fractionalization has any statistically significant effect on civil war in SSA, civil war in Asia is more likely with greater ethnic fractionalization. Studied by [13] found Economic shocks and civil war, indeed, they established the empirical literature investigate two different patterns. First, poor countries have a higher propensity to suffer from civil war. Second, civil war occurs when countries suffer negative income shocks. In a formal model we examine an explanation often suggested in the informal literature: civil wars occur in poor countries because the opportunity cost of fighting is small. This article shows that while this explanation fails to make sense of the first empirical pattern, it provides a coherent theoretical basis for the second. They then enriched the model to allow for private imperfect information about the state of the economy and show that mutual fears exacerbate the problem caused by negative income shocks.

Figure 1: Panels of Mean War Onset by Five-Year Periods: Total, Africa, and SSA



Greed is apply here as a devotion for closet gain. It is examined that the existence of a “significant” resource base is both a motive for rebellion and a facilitating factor. Insurgents have an incentive to claiming governments because of closet gain, which is a function of contingencies foregone by engaging in violence and the availability of lootable income, which is the payoff for successfully engaging in insurrection. But longing is explained by anomalous opportunities, being one of the main situations for benefit-seeking, rebel organizations to subsist. [14] Argued with Gold and Civil Conflict: Is there a Resource Curse? They found that the production of primary gold increases the likelihood that a country experiences conflict. Primary gold may be considered a resource curse.

This result proves to be counterintuitive to economic theory. Study by [15] found similar result with their study Do different types of natural resources have different effects on internal conflicts. They examined the relationship between fuel exports (% of GDP) and civil war, and mineral exports (% of GDP) and civil war, respectively. They also argued whether different types of natural resources give different types of internal conflicts. The two types of conflicts that they consider are (i) separatist conflict and (ii) government conflict. I find that neither fuel exports (% of GDP) nor mineral exports (% of GDP) are significantly linked to the onset of civil war. Mineral exports (% of GDP) is only significantly linked to separatist conflict, whereas fuel exports (% of GDP) is not linked to either two conflict types.[16]also worked on Differing Effects. Despite considerable research on the relationship between natural resources and civil wars, minimal investigation has been conducted regarding the effects on separatist conflicts.

According to their study the observable results support the idea that the potential effects are unique to separatist conflicts and not civil war in general. Such results demonstrate the variety of mechanisms through which a variable can generate observable changes.[17] investigated political institutions and the curse of natural resources, they think that the natural-resource curse is now a staple in the development economist’s diet. Natural resources have tended to lead to lower economic growth, except in democratic countries or those with robust institutions. This column presents a political economy model to explain this phenomenon, focusing on the threat of revolutions.

[18] Published why was the Arab world poised for revolution? Schooling, economic opportunities, and the Arab Spring. They think that in recent decades, the Arab region has been characterized by an expansion in schooling coupled with weak labor market conditions.

This pattern is especially pronounced in those countries that saw significant upheaval during the first year of the Arab Spring uprisings. [19] studied Economic grievance and the severity of civil war, they create a testable micro-foundation for the association between economic grievance and conflict intensity. They also argue that grievance does not lessen after the onset of civil war. Rather, pent-up grievance aggravates violence during the war. The more relative deprivation there is prior to the conflict, the more deadly and violently participants are expected to behave on the battlefield. Study by [20] found three strands of explanations on root causes of civil war in low-income and weak states in sub-Saharan Africa. They investigated a theoretical exploration of the relationship between schooling and the root causes of contemporary conflicts in low-income and weak states in sub-Saharan Africa. It does so by exploring three predominant theoretical strands on contemporary intrastate conflict and their implications to education: (1) the 'grievance' explanation; (2) an alternative economic explanation, focusing on the idea of the 'opportunity cost of rebellion'; and (3) a political explanation that shows the role of the ruling elites and the state.

Methodology and Data

As similarity, this study uses the basic Collier-Hoeffler applied with some various discussed in point below. The purpose is to assess the relative strengths of descriptions goods constant variables that proxy the competing descriptions discussed above. We apply a dependent variable measuring civil war outbreak set equal to 1 if a war was initiated during any 5-year period and 0 if no war occurred. Civil war is illustrated as an internal war in which(a) military operation was implicated, (b) the national government at the time was strongly associated, (c) significant resistance as measured by the ratio of disasters of the weaker to the active forces occurred on both sides, and (d) at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted.[21]apply Sensitivity analysis of empirical results on civil war onset, their studies use different definitions of civil war and analyze different time periods, so readers cannot easily determine if differences in empirical results are due to those factors or if most empirical results are just not robust. The authors apply a methodology for organized specification tests to check the robustness of empirical results.

They isolate causes of variation in empirical results by using the same definition of civil war and analyzing the same time period while systematically exploring the sensitivity of eighty-eight variables used to explain civil war in the literature. Studies [22] involved measuring state capacity; their work identifies and addresses key conceptual and measurement issues raised by measures of state capacity in studies of civil conflict. First, it reviews competing definitions and operationalizations of state capacity, focusing specifically on those that emphasize (1) military capacity, (2) bureaucratic administrative capacity, and (3) the quality and coherence of political institutions. Second, it critically assesses these measures on the basis of construct validity, focusing attention on whether they accurately capture the theoretical concept of state capacity, and whether they allow the researcher to differentiate between competing causal mechanisms. Third, it employs principal factor analysis to identify the underlying dimensionality of 15 different operationalizations of state capacity.

[23] Emphasized the importance of political stability as well as the level of democracy in the outbreak of civil war. In this article, therefore, we incorporate variables on democracy and transition. We applied a variable measuring the lowest score of a composite measure of democracy from [24], mainly capturing an objective measurement of political attendance from contrivance recruitment. Turnover is a substitute variable taking the expense one if a reversal in indicators issues in a movement from one category to another in the executive extent; a change of at least two units in the constraints extent; or a 100 percent increase or 50 percent decrease in the attendance dimension.

The conception or abrogation of States is also described as a polity adjustment. Studies by [25] investigated the Developmental Social Policy, Social Welfare Services and the Non -profit Sector in South Africa. The author argues that while South Africa's pluralist approach, involving a leading role for the state in partnership with voluntary organizations, is a viable policy option to address the country's developmental challenges, anomalies between policy proclamations and actual practice raises questions about the efficacy of the partnership model and the gendered nature of welfare provision. Whole of the African countries rather than theirs, which was defined to Sub-saharan Africa. The basic approach is $Pr(WARSA1960 -1999)=f(E, D, P, R, S, A)$, where E stand for economic variables, D connotes demographic variables (population size and geographic dispersion), P denotes political variables (peace extent, democracy, and transition), R stand for resources, S denotes socio-cultural, and A argues Sub-Saharan Africa. The North African model dropped due to deficient data.

According to the above assignment, this article applies three significant assumptions:

H1: Economic development (GDP per capita, GDP growth rate, primary commodity exports-GDP ratio and its squared term) is significantly and negatively associated with civil war outbreak in African countries. These empirical approaches involve both the opportunity costs of blow up. [26] argued on War signals, in the construct a theory of persistent civil conflicts, where persistence is driven by the endogenous dynamics of inter-ethnic trust and trade. In times of peace, agents belonging to two groups are randomly matched to trade bilaterally.

H2:[27] in the study of Social conflict in Africa, they described the Social Conflict in Africa Database, a new event dataset for conducting research and analysis on various forms of social and political unrest in Africa. SCAD contains information on over 7,200 instances of protests, riots, strikes, government repression, communal violence, and other forms of unrest for 47 African countries. This paper also involves political distortion as a comparative and a significant causation of civil war.

H3: Ethnic fractionalization should be significantly associated with civil war onset in African countries. Both high and low levels of fractionalization should recede the outset of civil war by affecting it harder to adapt the induction of new wars. This study also concedes ethnic influence as another significant explanation of civil war in African countries.

IV. Empirical Findings and Hypotheses

Illustrative Statistics

Table 1 detailed the illustrative statistics for African countries for the period, 1960-1999, showing also civil war outbreak and peace episodes. Out of these war outbreaks during the period, 40 occurred in African countries. As the table illustrates the African conflict episodes outset at almost the mean income of the region but slightly less than the mean income of the peace duration. With respect to the second economic variable - the growth rate of the economy in the preceding period, we discover those war periods were outranked by lower growth rates. This issue is significant with evidence that the lower is the rate of growth, the higher is the probability of unconstitutional political adjustment. [28] investigated the African economic growth record, and the roles of policy syndromes and governance, their study involve that most countries in Sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) had attained political independence from colonial rule by the mid 1960s. 3 The evidence shows that the region's economic performance, on average, has substantially lagged behind that of other regions of the world.

Investigation from [29] also found financing post-conflict recovery in Africa; they investigated the key challenges of financing countries in post-conflict transition. Such countries constitute a critical development challenge given their enormous socio-economic needs and the difficulties associated with providing effective development assistance. Conflict destroys a country's economic, governance and administrative institutions; weakens public financial management systems and increases transaction costs, which makes it difficult for principals to monitor their agents. This involves that increases in civil war outset in African countries were partly due to insurgent riposte to financial junctures in African countries. Minimum democracy was substantially larger in peace periods. In the same way, change was larger in peace periods. Despite, the illustrative data involves that social fractionalization is significant: civil war periods have higher mean appraisals.

This excludes the hypothesis that social cohesion enhances opportunity. On the other hand, ethnic influence is more typical in peace periods than in civil war periods. With respect to demographic variables, the illustrative data involves that civil war periods in African countries had markedly larger populations than the peace periods. Table 1 show that the concentration of the population is as typical in peace episodes as in civil war times. Sub-Saharan African countries are prone to civil war than to peace periods (Table 1).

Regression Findings and Hypotheses

The regression results are presented in table 2, with column 1 as the baseline result. We first turn to the economic variables. The risk of outset of civil war is positively but non-significantly correlated with per capita income. At least break down to extend support to the Collier-Hoeffler economic theory of civil war. Despite, the other surrogate for earnings foregone – economic growth rate in the preceding period – is robustly and negatively correlated with civil war outbreak in African countries.

An additional percentage point on the growth rate recedes the risk of civil war by about two percentage points. As [30], this study involves that the presence of natural resources seems to indicate easily lootable assets for loot-seeking insurgent's sources of support of justice-seeking movements. While we agree the hypothesis that economic development is significantly correlated with the outbreak of civil war in African countries, we involve that higher economic growth significantly recedes civil war while dependence on, or the opportunity of, natural resources increases the risk of war outset in the region. Democracy is clearly significant and adversely associated with civil war onset in Africa. This supports the findings of [31], with the study of Warming increases the risk of civil war in Africa. In our results, democracy involves being a significant explanatory variable, and yields strength to a more typical grievance-based and liberal peace-rooted description of civil war. Hence, we concede the assumption that democracy recedes the outbreak of civil war in African countries.

Further, in congruence with political theory, peace extent is extremely and adversely correlated among civil war in African countries. In extension, social fractionalization significantly deflates the risk of civil war outset. This means that cohesion is extensive for insurgent effectiveness consequently social fractionalization secures a society extensively in safety. This concert among the actuality in African countries, which is characterized by significant degree of religious and ethnic fractionalization. Hence, we acquire the explanation that ethnic fractionalization is extremely and adversely correlated among civil war outbreak in African countries. The non-sense of the conclusive coalition within ethnic influence and civil war in Africa emanates because fewer African communities are characterized by tribal influence.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for African countries

Variable	N	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min.	Max.	No civil war (N=334)	Civil war (N=40)
War starts	381	.1046	.3065	0	1	0	1
Natural log of GDP per capita (const. US\$)	398	6.9291	.6988	5.4026	8.8876	6.944	6.918
GDP per capita growth t-1	346	.6288	3.7490	-10.663	13.188	.868	-1.526
Primary commodity exports/GDP	402	.1698	.1344	.006	.567	.170	.187
Primary commodity exports/GDP squared	402	.0468	.0720	.000035	.3225	.047	.0511
Peace duration	381	301.355	169.2953	1	591	314.584	188.24
Minimum democracy	323	.4187	.5132	0	1.6560	.440	.240
Minimum democracy squared	323	.4380	.7842	0	2.7423	.462	.280
Transition	415	.3533	.4785	0	1	.350	.324
Social fractionalization	415	2946.266	2166.492	20	6974	2901.002	2960.874
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)	415	.4230	.4945	0	1	.411	.350
Natural log of population	411	15.3022	1.5168	10.6382	18.5274	15.113	16.088
Geographical dispersion	407	.5865	.1920	0	.922	.5835	.5837
Sub-saharan African model	415	.8461	.3611	0	1	.277	.384
Africa model	415	1	0	1	1	1	1

The coefficient of the size of the community is highly significant, positively correlated among civil war, and peace. This involves that risk is proportional to size. We further find that the Sub-saharan African countries model coefficient is significant exclusive at 15 percent significance level and positively associated with civil war. While this may suggest that Sub-Saharan Africa is subject to some lesser unobserved further, it is nevertheless consistent with the result of no Africa issue by [32], despite the coefficient from the former was weak when the absolute sample was applied.

Conclusion and Policy

The purpose of this article was to argue whether civil wars in Africa have economic and political causation. The approach applied is based on theory in which rebels will carriage a civil war. Using logit approaches the propositions were tested empirically.

Six variables, GDP per capita growth rate in the preceding time, the measure of natural resources, peace period, democracy, social fractionalization, and community amount are significant and forceful factors of the outbreak of civil wars in African countries.

These findings are alert for policy to recede civil war outbreak in African countries. Initial, African countries and their development confederates should concede measures to boost economic growth given that fast economic growth will progressively make rebellious hiring strong. Despite, given that such immense growth rates cannot be accomplished without extraneous support, it is critical that Africa's development partners and the international community as a gross need to improve assistance to the Continent. This is more so when it has been shown that assistance is practical in boosting economic growth. Following, the international community should take measures to make it more laborious for rebel groupings to sell the goods such as conflict diamonds which they graft. Third, African countries need to transform their economies aside from credence beyond dominant commodity exports[33]found the fundamental institutions of China's reforms and development, they involve that China's economic reforms have resulted in spectacular growth and poverty reduction

Table 2: Regression Findings of the Outbreak of Civil war in African countries

Explanatory Variable	Model 1 - (Baseline)	Model 2	Model 3
Natural log of GDP per capita (const. US\$)		.300 (.693)	.241 (.700)
GDP per capita growth t-1	-.158 (.073)**	-.158 (.073)**	-.153 (.073)**
Primary commodity exports/GDP	6.087 (2.344)**	5.487 (2.723)*	12.005 (8.866)
Primary commodity exports/GDP squared			-11.220 (14.895)
Peace duration	-.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.001)**	-.003 (.001)**
Minimum democracy	-5.862 (2.150)***	-5.922 (2.155)***	-5.763 (2.166)***
Minimum democracy squared	3.903 (1.462)***	3.910 (1.461)***	3.795 (1.634)***
Transition	.824 (.588)	.810 (.588)	.848 (.597)
Social fractionalization	-.0003 (.0001)**	-.0003 (.0001)**	-.0004 (.0001)**
Ethnic dominance (45-90%)	.715 (.505)	.696 (.510)	.672 (.519)
Natural log of population	1.052 (.364)***	1.058 (.365)***	1.058 (.370)***
Geographical dispersion	.343 (1.610)	.525 (1.657)	.193 (1.731)
Sub-saharan African model	1.893 (1.182)	2.307 (1.524)	2.220 (1.521)**
Constant	-19.898 (6.506)***	-22.360 (8.725)***	-22.281 (8.736)***
N	252	252	252
Pseudo R-squared	0.24	0.24	0.24
Log Likelihood	-52.76	-52.66	-52.35

Notes: + Standard errors in parentheses; indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively.

However, China's institutions look ill-suited to achieve such a result, and they indeed suffer from serious shortcomings. According to [34], appropriate economic reforms and policies would therefore be imperative in this direction. Fourth, to make loot-seeking rebels unpopular, African governments should transparently apply revenues from primary commodity exports to finance effective basic social services, including education and health.

Despite, economic development in African countries must be associated by political development and liberalization to secure amplified fallout. The measure of political reforms facing exceptional governance and ameliorated political rights should be boosted in African countries given that this article finding have shown that democracy is a fruitful engine to deflate the outbreak of civil war in the Region. Africa may conjointly need to check people expansion through a combination of economic and social as well as medical appliances given the discovery that the exposure of civil war in Africa is symmetrical to the proportion of the population.

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